

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI  
EASTERN DIVISION**

JOSEPH MICHAEL DEVON ENGEL,

Plaintiff,

VS.

GOVENER OF MISSOURI and ATT  
GENERAL,

Defendants.

No. 4:20-CV-1797-AGF

## MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon review of a civil complaint filed by Joseph Michael Devon Engel (registration no. 1069055), an inmate at Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center (“ERDCC”). For the reasons explained below, plaintiff will be given leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*, and this action will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

**28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action *in forma pauperis* is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds \$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. *Id.*

When plaintiff initiated this action, he did not file a separate motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff has filed over one hundred and twenty (120) civil rights cases in this Court since September of 2020. In many of these cases plaintiff did not include a separate motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Rather, within the complaint, he states: “Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees [or] Cost. I am in ERDCC I get 7.50 a month. But I owe money so I get \$5.00 Dollars a month.” ECF No. 1 at 2. Liberally construed, plaintiff can be understood to ask the Court to grant him leave to commence this action without prepayment of the required filing fee.

Plaintiff did not file a certified inmate account statement in this action, asserting “MODOC will not give me another copy of account.” The Court notes plaintiff filed a certified inmate account statement for the relevant period in another case plaintiff had pending in the Eastern District of Missouri: *see* docket entry at ECF No. 11 filed on January 8, 2021, in *Engel v. Corizon, et al.*, 4:20-CV-1695 NAB (E.D. Mo. filed Nov. 30, 2020). As such, the Court will reference that account statement to calculate plaintiff’s initial partial filing fee here.

A review of plaintiff’s account statement in the *Engel v. Corizon, et al.* case indicates an average monthly deposit of \$28.11 and an average monthly balance of \$0.04. The Court therefore finds plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of \$5.62, which is 20 percent of plaintiff’s average monthly deposit.

**28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed *in forma pauperis* if, *inter alia*, it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when legal

theories are “indisputably meritless,” or when the claims rely on “clearly baseless” factual allegations. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). “Clearly baseless” factual allegations include those that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” and “delusional.” *Id.* at 32-33 (quoting *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 325, 327). “As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” *Id.* at 33.

An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named defendants rather than vindicating a cognizable right. *Spencer v. Rhodes*, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), *aff’d* 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987). An action can also be considered malicious if it is part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits. *In re Tyler*, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). *See Cochran v. Morris*, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (when determining whether an action is malicious, the Court need not consider only the complaint before it, but may consider the plaintiff’s other litigious conduct).

To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” *Id.* at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. *Id.* at 1950-51. This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” *Id.* at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” *Id.* The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” *Id.* at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in

determining whether plaintiff's proffered conclusion is the most plausible, or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. *Id.* at 1950, 1951-52.

### **The Complaint**

Plaintiff, who identifies himself as a sovereign citizen, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the "Govener of Missouri" and the "ATT General" in their official capacities. Plaintiff prepared the complaint on two sheets of notebook paper following the format of this Court's Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint form. Plaintiff's allegations are stated in full as follows:

This is in Regards to the Shawn HorNBeck Issue about their police forces Ass[a]ulting me, and getting me ass[a]ulted in County and on street. [A]lmost got me killed. I am a sourvin [sic] citiz[e]n.

ECF No. 1 at 1.

For relief, plaintiff seeks "10 Trillion Dollars."

### **Discussion**

For the reasons discussed below, the Court has determined plaintiff has not stated a claim against any of the named defendants. As such, this action will be dismissed without prejudice. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff has sued both the Missouri Governor and Missouri Attorney General in their official capacities only. In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually "against the governmental entity itself." *See White v. Jackson*, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a "suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer." *Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp.*, 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). *See also Brewington v. Keener*, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit against sheriff and his deputy "must be treated as a suit against the County"); *Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb.*, 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that a "plaintiff who sues public

employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”); and *Elder-Keep v. Aksamit*, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent”). In order to prevail on an official capacity claim, the plaintiff must establish the governmental entity’s liability for the alleged conduct. *Kelly*, 813 F.3d at 1075.

In this case, both the Governor and Attorney General are employed by the State of Missouri. As such, the official capacity claims against them are actually claims against the State of Missouri itself. An individual acting for a state in an official capacity is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (stating that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983”). Furthermore, as plaintiff is suing for money damages only, his claims are also barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. *See Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ.*, 495 F.3d 591, 594 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages, but that a state official may be sued in an official capacity for prospective injunctive relief).

The Court notes that even if the Missouri Governor and Attorney General were sued in their individual capacities, plaintiff has not stated a claim against them. Liability in a § 1983 case is personal. *Frederick v. Motsinger*, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017). In other words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” *S.M. v. Krigbaum*, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” *Mayorga v. Missouri*, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Madewell v. Roberts*, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)). *See also Kohl v. Casson*, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff’s excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiff’s bail, and therefore, “there can be no causal connection

between any action on the part of the defendants and any alleged deprivation” of plaintiff’s rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the defendant to the challenged action. *See Bitzan v. Bartruff*, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2019).

Here, plaintiff has not presented any factual allegations against the Governor or the Attorney General establishing they were personally responsible for any purported assault against him by a police officer. More specifically, plaintiff has not presented any factual allegations against the Governor or the Attorney General at all. Despite being named as defendants, they are not mentioned in the “Statement of Claim” section of plaintiff’s complaint and he provides no support for the inference that either defendant violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

For all the reasons discussed above, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against either the Governor or the Attorney General, and the claims against them must be dismissed.

Finally, it appears this action is also subject to dismissal because it is malicious. *See Spencer v. Rhodes*, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), *aff’d* 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987) (an action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the defendants rather than vindicating a cognizable right). Since filing this action, plaintiff has filed over one hundred and twenty (120) other complaints in this Court alleging that his civil rights have been violated by these defendants and other state and local entities and officials. Plaintiff submits the pleadings in bulk, and he specifies that he intends each set of pleadings to be docketed as an individual civil action. The nature of those pleadings and plaintiff’s claims for damages are roughly the same as those in the instant action. It therefore appears that this action is part of an attempt to harass these defendants and others by bringing repetitious lawsuits, not a legitimate attempt to vindicate a cognizable right. *See Spencer*, 656 F. Supp. at 461-63; *see also In re Billy Roy Tyler*, 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that an action is malicious when it is a part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits). This action is subject to dismissal for this reason, as well.

Plaintiff is cautioned to avoid the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits. First, a prisoner who has filed three or more actions or appeals that were dismissed for one of the reasons stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which limits his future ability to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Second, the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits can be interpreted as an abuse of the judicial process, which can result in court-imposed limitations on the ability to bring future lawsuits. This Court is “vested with the discretion to impose sanctions upon a party under its inherent disciplinary power.” *Bass v. General Motors Corp.*, 150 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). This includes the discretion to craft and impose sanctions to deter litigants from engaging in “conduct which abuses the judicial process.” *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1991). *See Tyler*, 839 F.2d at 1292 (affirming the district court’s *sua sponte* determination that a litigant should be limited to filing one lawsuit per month pursuant to certain conditions precedent as a sanction for the litigant’s repeated abuse of the judicial process). These powers stem from “the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” *Id.* (quoting *Link v. Wabash R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).

Having considered plaintiff’s abusive litigation practices and the manner in which he prepared the instant complaint and other civil complaints, the Court concludes that it would be futile to permit plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in this action. The Court will therefore dismiss this action at this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Accordingly,


**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that plaintiff’s motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* (ECF No. 1) is **GRANTED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of \$5.62 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance

payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that this action is **DISMISSED** pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.

Dated this 13th day of January, 2021.

  
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AUDREY G. FLEISSIG  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE